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HOW SPECIAL IS THE SPECIAL TIMING RULE?
ANALYZING THE TIMING OF FICA TAXATION IN
NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLANS
Alan J. Ponce
INTRODUCTION
Many employers offer nonqualified deferred compensation plans
as a benefit to select employees, and those plans allow the employees
to prepare for retirement in a tax-efficient manner.1 For employers,
designing and administering such plans in compliance with federal
law represents a paramount concern in order to achieve the tax
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unwavering love and support throughout law school; to my colleagues, for your guidance and
encouragement on this Note; to the College of Law faculty and my Law Review peers; and to Him who
is able to do exceedingly abundantly above all that we ask or think.
1. BRUCE J. MCNEIL, NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS § 1:2 (2016–2017 ed.
2016). A “nonqualified deferred compensation plan” is any “agreement, method, [or] program” that
provides for the deferral of compensation. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(a) (2007). The “deferral of
compensation” exists where an employee, pursuant to the terms of the plan, obtains “a legally binding
right during a taxable year to compensation that, pursuant to the terms of the plan, is or may be payable
to (or on behalf of) the service provider in a later taxable year.” Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b) (2007).
The primary appeal of such plans is that employers can use them to “attract, retain and
motivate . . . key employee[s] . . . [by] provid[ing] additional retirement benefits [and] . . . achiev[ing]
certain and desired business objectives for which incentives may be provided to [such] key
employee[s].” MCNEIL, supra, § 1:2.
Nonqualified plans “do not qualify for the special tax treatment afforded to plans that meet the
qualification requirements of Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,” including “a current
deduction for the employer for its contributions to a trust exempt under Section 501(a) and used in
connection with a qualified plan under Section 404 of the Code, tax deferral for the employee on the
contributions and investment income under Section 402 of the Code.” Id.
Applicable treasury regulations provide that “the term ‘plan’ includes any agreement, method,
program, or other arrangement, including an agreement, method, program, or other arrangement that
applies to one person or individual.” Id. The regulations further define what constitutes a “plan”:
A plan may be adopted unilaterally by the service recipient or may be
negotiated or agreed to by the service recipient and one or more service
providers or service provider representatives. An agreement, method,
program, or other arrangement may constitute a plan regardless of whether
it is an employee benefit plan under section 3(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”). The
requirements of section 409A are applied as if a separate plan or plans is
maintained for each service provider.
Id.
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advantages such plans entail.2 However, for these employers, there
remains an inherent ambiguity in the tax code regarding how and
when employers should withhold Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA) taxes—that is, Social Security and Medicare taxes—on
deferred compensation in nonqualified retirement plans.3
Tax regulations provide two distinct methods for withholding
FICA taxes on nonqualified plans: the “general timing rule” and the
“special timing rule.”4 Which method the employer uses can
substantially impact the total amount of taxes an employee owes.5
For this reason, employers must understand whether the tax code
requires one method versus the other in a given situation or else risk
litigation from employees adversely impacted by the withholding
method used.6
In 2015, the Henkel Corporation learned this lesson the hard way
when it lost a class action suit filed by a former employee under these
very circumstances.7 Davidson v. Henkel Corp. is the first case to
demonstrate the implications of an employer’s failure to use the
special timing rule and shows that the stakes can be significant.8 Yet,
whether the tax code mandates method versus the other remains an

2. MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 1:2.
3. See Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit
Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. 4542-01, 4544 (Jan. 29, 1999) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 31 & 602). The
preamble to the final regulations observes that “[s]everal commentators requested clarification as to
whether the special timing rule is elective and whether failure to comply with the special timing rule
may lead to the imposition of interest or penalties.” Id. In response to such inquiries, the preamble
explicitly provides that “[t]he special timing rule is not elective” and failure to apply the special timing
rule may result in “interest and penalties [being] imposed.” Id. However, such language does not appear
in the final regulations themselves (outside the preamble) and ultimately leads the court in Davidson v.
Henkel Corp. to conclude that the special timing rule “is not mandatory.” Davidson v. Henkel Corp.,
No. 12–cv–14103, 2015 WL 74257, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2015); see discussion infra Part II.
4. I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2) (Supp. 2015); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)–1(a)(2) (2003); Lee Nunn et al.,
FICA Taxation of SERPS: Lessons Learned from Davidson v. Henkel, 40 J. PENSION PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE 103, 103 (2014).
5. See Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *1–2; Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 103.
6. See MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4 (“The importance of applying the special timing rule under
section 31.3121(v)(2)-1 of the Treasury Regulations for taking into account an amount deferred under a
nonqualified deferred compensation plan as wages for the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(“FICA”) purposes cannot be overstated.”); see also Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 103.
7. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *9–10; Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 103.
8. See Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *9–10; Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 103.
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unsettled question in the context of nonqualified deferred
compensation plans.9
Part I of this Note provides background on FICA taxation and the
special timing rule and introduces the Henkel case. Part II explores
the inherent ambiguity that exists and argues that—despite language
to the contrary in Henkel—federal regulations mandate that
employers must use the special timing rule for FICA withholding in
the context of nonqualified deferred compensation plans. Part III
proposes a solution to resolve the ambiguity going forward.
I. Background
A. Introduction to FICA Taxation
FICA refers to a federal payroll tax used to fund Social Security
and Medicare.10 FICA taxes consist of both an employee share
pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 310111 and an employer
share pursuant to IRC § 3102.12 Federal law requires employers to
withhold the employee share from employee wages and pay the
employee share together with the employer share.13 FICA taxes
include both the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) tax component14 and the hospital insurance (Medicare) tax
component.15
FICA taxation entails a tiered rate structure, using three distinct tax
rates as follows: (1) the OASDI component has a 6.2% tax16 on
wages up to the Social Security Wage Base (SSWB) ($118,500 for
2016);17 (2) the Medicare portion has a 1.45% tax on all wages;18 and
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104.
11. I.R.C. § 3101 (Supp. 2015); Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104.
12. I.R.C. § 3102; Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104.
13. I.R.C. § 3102(b)(2); Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104.
14. I.R.C. § 3101(a).
15. Id. § 3101(b).
16. Id. § 3101(a).
17. Id. § 3121(a); OASDI and SSI Program Rates & Limits, 2016, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (Oct.
2015),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog_highlights/RatesLimits2016.html
[https://perma.cc/7TA2-LQSE].
18. I.R.C. § 3101(b)(1); Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104.
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(3) there is a 0.9% Medicare “surtax” on employee wages in excess
of $200,000.19 Only the employee, and not the employer, pays the
0.9% Medicare surtax.20 Importantly, once an employee has reached
the SSWB for the year, the marginal rate for the 6.2% OASDI
component becomes zero.21
B. FICA Taxation Timing
1. General Timing Versus the Special Timing Rule
Generally, for all taxpayers outside the specific context of
nonqualified deferred compensation plans, the timing of FICA
taxation operates in the same manner as income taxes in that an
employer withholds and pays FICA taxes as an employee’s wages are
paid.22 This practice represents the general timing rule.23 This means
that the general timing rule typically operates simultaneous to income
taxation on wages.24
Different rules apply in the context of nonqualified deferred
compensation plans.25 Although the regulations do not explicitly
19. I.R.C. § 3101(b)(2); Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104.
20. I.R.C. § 3101(b)(2); Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104.
21. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 104–05.
22. Id. at 103.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 104.
25. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The types of plans included in 26 I.R.C. § 3121(a)(5),
which are therefore excluded from application of the special timing rule, include the following: (A) a
trust described in § 401(a) made tax-exempt under § 501(a) (unless payments are made to an employee
of the trust for services performed as an employee and not as a beneficiary of the trust); (B) an annuity
described in § 403(a); (C) a simplified employee pension as defined in § 408(k)(1) (excluding
contributions described in § 408(k)(6)); (D) an annuity contract described in § 403(b) (excluding
payments made pursuant to a salary reduction agreement); (E) a government deferred compensation
plan; (F) an ERISA welfare plan in which cost of living payments are made to supplement pension
benefits under a qualified pension plan; (G) certain payments under a cafeteria plan pursuant to § 125;
(H) certain arrangements under § 408(p); (I) a plan under § 457(e)(11)(A)(ii) maintained by an eligible
employer defined in § 457(e)(1). I.R.C. § 3121(a)(5). See also MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4.
Further, not all forms of nonqualified benefits are eligible to use the special timing rule. See
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(b)(4) (2003). For example, the rule excludes stock options and stock
appreciation rights:
[A] stock value right is a right granted to an employee with respect to one
or more shares of employer stock that, to the extent exercised, entitles the
employee to a payment for each share of stock equal to the excess, or a
percentage of the excess, of the value of a share of the employer’s stock on
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define what constitutes “nonqualified deferred compensation,” for
purposes of 26 I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2), “the term ‘nonqualified deferred
compensation plan’ means any plan or other arrangement for deferral
of compensation other than a plan described in subsection (a)(5).”26
Where the employer provides such a plan, the timing of FICA
taxation may differ from the general timing rule.27 Specifically,
Treasury Regulation § 31.3121(v)(2)–1 provides a special timing rule
that allows the employer to withhold FICA taxes earlier than they
otherwise do under the general timing rule; this has the ultimate
effect of accelerating the payment of FICA taxes and potentially
reducing the overall tax burden on the taxpayer—a tax planning tool
not otherwise available to taxpayers outside the context of
nonqualified deferred compensation plans.28
2. Account Balance Versus Nonaccount Balance Plans
The special timing rule operates differently for “account balance”29
versus “nonaccount balance”30 plans,31 but it results in the same
the date of exercise over a specified price (greater than zero).
Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 106–07. The rule generally does not apply to restricted property, but note
that “a plan under which an employee obtains a legally binding right to receive property (whether or not
the property is restricted property) in a future year” may constitute deferred compensation. Id. Certain
welfare benefits, including vacation time, sick time, compensatory time, disability pay, and severance
pay, do not qualify for the special timing rule; neither do benefits provided in connection with
impending termination, including widow benefits and terminations within twelve months of establishing
a plan. Benefits established after termination of employment fall outside the special timing rule, but note
that “cost-of-living adjustments on benefit payments under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan
. . . shall not be considered benefits established after the employee’s termination of employment.” Id.
The rule also excludes excess parachute payments, if entered into or renewed after June 14, 1984, and
compensation for current services based on relevant facts and circumstances. Id.
26. I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2)(C).
27. See generally I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)–1(a)(2); Nunn et al., supra note
4, at 103. The scope of this note focuses primarily on “account balance” plans. The FICA rules differ
substantially for “nonaccount balance” plans, which are beyond the scope of this note. Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3121(v)(2)–1(a)(2).
28. I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2)(a); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)–1(a)(2); see Nunn et al., supra note 4, at
106.
29. “Account balance plans include nonqualified elective deferral plans, defined contribution
supplemental executive retirement plans (DC SERPs), and cash balance SERPs. These arrangements
credit participants with notional principal contributions and earnings. The benefits payable are based
solely on the notional account balances.” Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 107. The applicable treasury
regulations further explain account balance plans:
[I]f benefits for an employee are provided under a nonqualified deferred
compensation plan that is an account balance plan, the amount deferred for
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ultimate effect—namely, that benefits get included in FICA taxation
earlier than they otherwise would under the general timing rule.32 For
account balance plans, employers withhold FICA upon the later of
(a) when services are performed, or (b) when there is no longer a
“substantial risk of forfeiture.”33 An employee no longer retains a
substantial risk of forfeiture once the benefit fully vests, which can
occur at different times depending on the nature of the plan and
compensation deferred.34 In the context of an employee’s voluntarily
a period equals the principal amount credited to the employee’s account for
the period, increased or decreased by any income attributable to the
principal amount through the date the principal amount is required to be
taken into account as wages.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c)(1)(ii)(B). In this context, income “means any increase or decrease in
the amount credited to an employee’s account that is attributable to amounts previously credited to the
employee’s account, regardless of whether the plan denominates that increase or decrease as income.”
Id.
Additionally, note that:
A plan does not fail to be an account balance plan merely because, under
the terms of the plan, benefits payable to an employee are based solely on a
specified percentage of an account maintained for all (or a portion of) plan
participants under which principal amounts and income are credited (or
debited) to such account.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c)(1)(iii)(A).
30. “Nonaccount balance” plans refer to plans that are not account balance plans. See Nunn et al,
supra note 4, at 107. The treasury regulations explain the nuances of “nonaccount balance” plans:
[I]f benefits for an employee are provided under a nonqualified deferred
compensation plan that is not an account balance plan (a nonaccount
balance plan), the amount deferred for a period equals the present value of
the additional future payment or payments to which the employee has
obtained a legally binding right . . . under the plan during that period.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c)(2)(i). “Present value” takes on a specific meaning in this context:
[T]he value as of a specified date of an amount or series of amounts due
thereafter, where each amount is multiplied by the probability that the
condition or conditions on which payment of the amount is contingent will
be satisfied, and is discounted according to an assumed rate of interest to
reflect the time value of money.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c)(2)(ii). Such arrangements generally represent defined-benefit plans for
accounting purposes, such as nonqualified DB pensions or life annuities. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at
107.
31. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c).
32. See Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 106.
33. I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2)(a); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(e)(3); MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4; Nunn
et al., supra note 4, at 105–06.
34. I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (stating that “[t]he rights of a person in property are subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture if such person’s rights to full enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the future
performance of substantial services by any individual”); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(e)(3)
(incorporating the statutory definition of “substantial risk of forfeiture” from I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) for
purposes of the special timing rule); Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 106.
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deferred wages, vesting occurs immediately as services are
performed;35 in the context of employer-funded contributions, vesting
may occur pursuant to a predetermined vesting schedule, such as
attaining a specified number of years of service with the employer.36
For nonaccount balance plans, employers can withhold FICA prior
to the “resolution date,” which represents the point at which the
amount of the benefit is earned, vested, and ascertainable.37
Generally, a benefit is ascertainable at termination of employment.38
This Note refers to the special timing rule generally, whether in the
context of account balance or nonaccount balance plans. In either
context, the special timing rule results in FICA taxation that occurs
earlier than it otherwise would under general timing—during the
employee’s working years—and almost always reduces the
employee’s overall FICA tax liability.39 Importantly, in the event that
an employer fails to use the special timing rule in the context of
nonqualified deferred compensation plans, federal regulations require
the employer to revert to the general timing rule and pay FICA taxes
as deferred wages are paid.40
The regulations “do not define ‘substantial risk of forfeiture’ for purposes of Section 3121(v) of
the Code,” but “the committee reports in connection with the passage of the 1983 Amendments indicate
that Congress intended the phrase ‘substantial risk of forfeiture’ to be interpreted in a manner similar to
the interpretation the phrase is given under Section 83 of the Code.” MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4
(construing H.R. REP. NO. 98-47, at 147 (1983) (Conf. Rep.)).
35. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 105–06. As one commentator observes, “although some
nonqualified deferred compensation plans contain a substantial risk of forfeiture, most do not.” MCNEIL,
supra note 1, § 12:4. Indeed, nonqualified deferred compensation plans represent “unfunded and
unsecured plans” that generally “do not have a substantial risk of forfeiture provision.” Id. Therefore,
“for most nonqualified deferred compensation plans, Section 3121(v)(2) applies at the time the services
are performed.” Id.
36. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A–1(d).
37. Id.; Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 107–08 (“[T]he ‘resolution date’ . . . is the date when the only
assumptions required to calculate a present value of the deferred income payments are interest,
mortality, and cost of living adjustments. For many nonaccount balance plans, the resolution date is the
date of termination of employment. However, when optional forms of benefits are not actuarially
equivalent, the resolution date may not occur until the participant has irrevocably elected a form of
payment.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(v)(2)-1(e)(4)(i) & -1(c)(2)(iii).
38. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 108.
39. See discussion infra Section II.B.
40. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)–1(d)(1)(ii); Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 105–06, 112. “If an amount
deferred for a period . . . is not taken into account [under the special timing rule], then the . . . benefit
payments attributable to that amount deferred are included as [FICA] wages in accordance with the
general timing rule of Section 31.3121(v)(2)–1(a)(1).” MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4.
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C. The Henkel Case
1. Background and Ruling
In Henkel, a class of former Henkel employees participated in a
nonqualified deferred compensation plan that provided an annuity
stream of nonqualified retirement benefits.41 Through administrative
error, Henkel failed to withhold employee FICA payroll taxes on
vested benefits using the special timing rule, which Henkel
eventually discovered during a 2011 compliance review.42
Henkel subsequently notified plan participants of the situation in a
September 2011 letter, stating “. . . it was determined that Social
Security FICA payroll taxes . . . have not been properly withheld.”43
The letter further explained that failure to use the special timing rule
required Henkel to use a “pay as you go” method under the general
timing rule.44 This resulted in a substantially higher tax burden to the
employees, who sued Henkel for damages in federal court.45

41. Davidson v. Henkel Corp., No. 12–cv–14103, 2015 WL 74257, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2015).
Henkel’s plan, called the “Henkel Corporation Deferred Compensation and Supplemental Retirement
and Investment Plan,” was designed to provide select employees with a tax-advantaged retirement
savings opportunity by allowing eligible participants to defer income taxation (as opposed to FICA
taxation) on earned wages until the time of their retirement. Id. Early in its opinion, the Henkel court
concisely summarized the underlying financial logic of the plan, observing that “[p]resumptively, at
retirement, the [p]articipants would be taxed in a lower tax bracket [compared to the applicable tax
bracket during their working years], thereby decreasing their overall tax liability.” Id.
Importantly, Henkel’s plan constituted a nonqualified deferred compensation plan for purposes
of I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2)(C), thereby making compensation deferred under the terms of the plan eligible
for early inclusion of FICA taxation under the special timing rule. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The letter from Henkel Corporation to impacted plan participants stated the following:
During recent compliance reviews performed by an independent
consulting firm, it was determined that Social Security FICA payroll taxes
associated with your nonqualified retirement benefits have not been
properly withheld . . . .
At the time of your retirement, FICA taxes were payable on the
present value of all future non-qualified retirement payments. Therefore,
you are subject to FICA Taxes on your non-qualified retirement payments
on a “pay as you go” basis for 2008 and beyond, which are the tax years
that are still considered “open” for retroactive payment purposes.
Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *1 (omissions in original).
44. Id. at *1–2.
45. Id. at *2. As of the time of this writing, the calculation of damages is still outstanding.
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In 2015 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
ultimately ruled in favor of the employees, but not on the basis that
Henkel had violated federal tax law. Rather, the court found that
Henkel had violated the enforcement provisions of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)—which require the
employer to properly effectuate a written Plan Document—because
Henkel’s conduct reduced the employees’ benefits under the plan.46
After declaring that the “[d]efendants did not violate federal [tax]
law,” the court separately concluded that Henkel violated the
enforcement provisions of ERISA by “[violating] provisions of the
Plan and the Plan’s purpose.”47 A primary purpose of ERISA, the
court notes, serves to “ensure the integrity and primacy of the written
plans.”48
The court emphasized that Henkel’s written plan document
included language obligating Henkel to “ratably withhold . . . all
applicable [f]ederal, state or local taxes” on behalf of plan
participants.49 Importantly, the court interpreted this provision to
mean that the plan vested Henkel “with control over [p]articipants’
funds” and required Henkel to “properly withhold the [p]articipants’
taxes when they were assessable or due.”50 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that because Henkel created a higher FICA tax liability for
plan participants by failing to apply the special timing rule, Henkel
“failed to adhere to the purpose and terms of the Plan.”51 As a result,
the court found the company liable for damages, regardless of

46. Id. at *9–10. Henkel maintained the plan as a “Top Hat” plan for ERISA purposes. Id. at *1.
“Top Hat plans are ‘unfunded’ and maintained by the employer chiefly ‘for the purpose of providing
deferred compensation to a select group of management or highly compensated employees.’” Id. at *6.
47. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8 (“However, even though Defendants did not violate federal
[tax] law, the Court finds that Defendants violated provisions of the Plan and the Plan’s purpose.”). As
the court notes, the purpose for such nonqualified plans serves primarily to “provid[e] deferred
compensation to a select group of management or highly compensated employees.” Id. at *6. Put
another way, “the purpose of the Plan is to provide a supplemental benefit based on deferred
compensation.” Id. at *9.
48. Id. at *7 (quoting Health Cost Controls v. Isbell, 139 F.3d 1070, 1072 (6th Cir. 1997)).
49. Id. at *8.
50. Id.
51. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8.
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whether the Code mandates use of the special timing rule in these
circumstances.52
2. FICA Implications of the Henkel Case
The Henkel ruling represented less a case about taxes and more a
case about plan administration.53 However, the Henkel court went on
to analyze a question not yet answered by federal courts: whether
Henkel’s failure to apply the special timing rule itself constituted a
violation of federal tax law.54 Put another way, the Henkel case was
the first to specifically address an area of subtle ambiguity in the tax
code: whether employers who offer nonqualified deferred
compensation plans can elect to use or not to use the special timing
rule for FICA withholding on an employee’s deferred wages.55
Surprisingly, the court found that the IRC does not itself mandate
use of the special timing rule.56 It reasoned that although language in
the federal regulations explicitly emphasizes that “[t]he special
timing rule is not elective,”57 the fact that those regulations also
provide alternative procedures if an employer fails to use the special
timing rule inherently “undermines the contention that the [s]pecial
[t]iming [r]ule is mandatory.”58
In this way, the Henkel court indicates that because employers who
fail to use the special timing rule may revert to the general timing
rule, the special timing rule must not be mandatory.59 In its
52. Id. at *9.
53. Id. at *3 (“This case is not about how the [d]efendants resolved the FICA issue after it arose, but
instead about how the FICA issue came about in the first place. Intrinsically, this case is not about taxes,
but is instead about [d]efendant’s administration of the [p]lan.”). The Henkel court further emphasized
that the plaintiffs do not merely seek “a tax refund in disguise,” but rather that “[Henkel’s] failure to
follow the special timing rule [resulted] in a reduction to [the plaintiffs’] benefits.” Id. at *4; see also
MCNEIL, supra note 1, at § 12:4.
54. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *7–8.
55. See id.
56. Id. at *8.
57. Id. at *8 (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 4542-01, 4544 (Jan. 29, 1999) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 31
& 602)); see also MCNEIL, supra note 1, at § 12:4 (“[T]he preamble to the final regulations provides
that the special timing rule is not elective and, if an employer does not take an amount deferred into
account (including payment of any resulting FICA tax) when required by Section 3121(v)(2) [the special
timing rule], interest and penalties may be imposed.”).
58. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8.
59. Id.
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conclusion, the court notes that using the special timing rule
“provides more favorable tax treatment for deferred compensation
plans,” but goes on to explicitly emphasize that “nothing in the
[Code] mandate[s] use of the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule.”60
II. Analysis
A. Problems with the Henkel Case
The following sections analyze the problems with the court’s
finding that the IRC does not mandate use of the special timing rule
for nonqualified deferred compensation plans.61
1. Federal Regulations Explicitly Mandate Use of the Special
Timing Rule
First, language in the preamble to the federal regulations directly
addresses whether the special timing rule is elective and provides an
explicit answer in the negative.62 Ever since the special timing rule’s
introduction in 1996 proposed regulations, federal regulators
recognized the possible ambiguity surrounding its use.63 After an
open comment period, in 1999, the IRS released “long-awaited final
regulations” that sought to decidedly resolve this ambiguity.64
In the preamble to those final regulations, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) noted that “[s]everal commentators requested
clarification as to whether the special timing rule is elective and
whether failure to comply with the special timing rule may lead to the
imposition of interest or penalties.”65 In response to those inquiries,
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. 4542-01, 4544 (Jan.
29, 1999) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 31 & 602).
63. MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4 (construing 61 Fed. Reg. 2194 (Jan. 25, 1996)).
64. See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)–1 (2003); MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4. The final regulations
became effective on January 1, 2000. MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:4. Note that the final regulations
include “certain special transition rules for amounts deferred and benefits paid before January 1, 2000,
including allowing employers to use a reasonable, good faith interpretation of Sections 3121(v)(2) and
3306(r)(2).” Id.
65. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544.
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the preamble provides an unambiguous answer: “The special timing
rule is not elective and, if an employer does not take an amount
deferred into account (including payment of any resulting FICA tax)
when required by § 3121(v)(2), interest and penalties may be
imposed.”66
Such language contradicts the Henkel court’s conclusion that it
“finds nothing in the IRC mandating the use of the [s]pecial [t]iming
[r]ule.”67 Rather, the federal regulations, which provide the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s official and authoritative interpretation
of the IRC,68 mandate use of the special timing rule by stating it “is
not elective.”69 Indeed, in the sixteen years between the release of the
final regulations in 1999 and the Henkel decision in 2015, most
practitioners would have never intentionally failed to apply it.70
Even the Henkel Corporation itself betrays an understanding of the
special timing rule as nonelective, evidenced by its 2011 letter to plan
participants, which stated that “FICA payroll taxes associated with
your nonqualified retirement benefits have not been properly
withheld.”71 In this way, the Henkel Corporation characterized its
own failure to use the special timing rule as “improper” in the context
of its nonqualified deferred compensation plan.72 Thus, the Henkel
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Davidson v. Henkel Corp., No. 12–cv–14103, 2015 WL 74257, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2015).
68. Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/privacy-disclosure/tax-code-regulations-and-official-guidance
[https://perma.cc/4JVZ-TUPX] (last updated Oct. 6, 2017). “Treasury regulations (26 C.F.R.)—
commonly referred to as Federal tax regulations—pick up where the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
leaves off by providing the official interpretation of the IRC by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.”
Id. As required by law, “all regulatory documents are published by the IRS in the Federal Register” and
also in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Id.
69. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544.
70. E-mail from Lee Nunn, C.P.A., Senior Vice President, Aon Consulting Exec. Benefits, to author
(Oct. 20, 2016, 06:15 EST) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
71. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *9 (quoting a September 2011 letter from the Director of
Benefits at Henkel Corporation to all plaintiffs); MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:5.
72. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *2 (quoting a September 2011 letter from the Director of
Benefits at Henkel Corporation to all plaintiffs); MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:5.
Further, when Mr. Davidson contacted Henkel Corporation to challenge the reduction in his
benefits in response to their September 2011 letter, he received a response from the Henkel Corporation
on October 14, 2011, that conceded, “at the time you commenced receipt of this benefit, Henkel should
have applied FICA tax to the present value of your nonqualified pension benefit.” Henkel Corp., 2015
WL 74257, at *2. This method describes the special timing rule. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(e)(4)
(2003); see also Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 106 (“For nonaccount balance plans . . . the deadline for
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Corporation’s understanding of the special timing rule apparently
conformed to a natural reading of the preamble language—namely,
that if the special timing rule “is not elective,” it must therefore be
mandatory.73
2. Questionable Analysis by the Henkel Court
The court dismissed the preamble’s language not for lack of clarity
or authority, but for what it considered an inherent contradiction,
observing “that same regulation continues on to provide alternative
procedures to be followed if the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule is not
followed”—namely, the general timing rule.74 As the court reasoned,
“[t]he existence of additional procedures that must be followed if the
[s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule is not applied undermines the contention that
the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule is mandatory.”75 In other words, the court
concluded that because Treasury Regulation § 31.3121(v)(2)–1
instructs employers to apply the general timing rule if they fail to
apply the special timing rule, the special timing rule must therefore
be optional.76
But this conclusion does not follow its premise. The mere fact that
the regulations provide for “additional procedures” in the event that
the employer “[fails] to take an amount deferred into account under
the special timing rule”77 does not in itself suggest the special timing
rule is optional, especially where those regulations expressly say
otherwise.78 It simply suggests that the IRS anticipated the practical
including the benefit in FICA income extends to the resolution date, when the amount of the benefit is
ascertainable. Generally, a benefit is ascertainable at termination of employment.”).
73. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544.
74. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8 (referring to Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(d)(ii)(A),
which prescribes that “[f]ailure to take an amount deferred into account under the special timing rule”
results in the “benefit payments attributable to that amount deferred [being] included as wages in
accordance with the general timing rule of paragraph (a)(1) of this section”).
75. Id.
76. Id. (“The existence of additional procedures that must be followed if the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule
is not applied undermines the contention that the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule is mandatory. Accordingly, the
court finds the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule is not mandatory and that [p]laintiffs have not shown that
[d]efendants failed to withhold taxes in accordance with federal law.”).
77. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(d)(ii)(A).
78. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544 (“The special
timing rule is not elective and, if an employer does not take an amount deferred into account (including
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reality that employers might make the very sort of administrative
error that the Henkel Corporation made.79
As a related example, IRC § 409A, the primary federal law that
governs nonqualified deferred compensation plans,80 requires
companies to timely distribute benefits in accordance with the
participant’s distribution election;81 should the company fail to make
timely payment as required by § 409A, the same federal regulations
further provide for corrective relief that prescribes highly specific
“additional procedures” the taxpayer must follow in the event of a
§ 409A “failure.”82
payment of any resulting FICA tax) when required by section 3121(v)(2), interest and penalties may be
imposed.”).
79. See Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *1. As another more universal example of the IRS
providing a practical alternative to mandatory requirements in the IRC, the IRS provides specific
procedures for taxpayers who do not pay income taxes when due. Topic 201 – The Collection Process,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc200/tc201 [https://perma.cc/H7V8-UPBH]
(last updated Apr. 14, 2017). “If [the taxpayer] cannot pay in full, [she] should send in as much as [she]
can with the notice and explore other payment arrangements.” Id. “If [she] can[no]t full [sic] pay under
an installment agreement, [she] may propose an offer in compromise.” Id. “Prior to approving [a]
request to delay collection, [the IRS] may ask [the taxpayer] to complete a Collection Information
Statement . . . and provide proof of [her] financial status (this may include information about your assets
and your monthly income and expenses).” Id. If the taxpayer does not initiate these corrective
procedures, the IRS takes action to collect unpaid taxes by filing a notice of federal tax lien, serving a
notice of levy, and offsetting any federal refund to which the taxpayer is otherwise entitled. Id. These
procedures prescribe the specific steps taxpayers must follow in the event that they fail to pay income
taxes when due; that said, the existence of such procedures does in itself not suggest that paying income
taxes in the first place is optional. Id.
80. See I.RC. § 409A (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.409A–1(b)(1) (2007) (“[A] plan provides for
the deferral of compensation if, under the terms of the plan and the relevant facts and circumstances, the
service provider has a legally binding right during a taxable year to compensation that, pursuant to the
terms of the plan, is or may be payable to (or on behalf of) the service provider in a later taxable year.
Such compensation is deferred compensation for purposes of section 409A, this section and §§ 1.409A–
2 through 1.409A–6.”).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A–3(d) (“[A] payment is treated as made upon the date specified under the
plan (including a date specified under paragraph (a)(4) of this section) if the payment is made at such
date or a later date within the same taxable year of the service provider or, if later, by the 15th day of the
third calendar month following the date specified under the plan and the service provider is not
permitted, directly or indirectly, to designate the taxable year of the payment.”).
82. I.R.S. Notice 2008-113, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1305 (Dec. 5, 2008) (“This notice provides taxpayers the
ability to correct certain operational failures to comply with section 409A of the Code, or to limit the
amount of additional taxes due to a failure to comply with section 409A.”); see also REGINA OLSHAN &
ERICA F. SCHOHN, SECTION 409A HANDBOOK 827 (2010) (“When an operational failure is discovered,
the first task is to break down Notice 2008-113 into manageable analytic pieces . . . .”). Olshan’s 409A
treatise testifies to the complexity of corrective procedures prescribed by Notice 2008-113, observing
that “[t]he correction provisions of Notice 2008-113 are organized by year of correction, rather than by
type of failure, which makes the Notice difficult to navigate.” OLSHAN & SCHOHN, supra.
In this way, Notice 2008-113 represents precisely the sort of “additional procedures” that the
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In such circumstances, no one contends that the existence of these
relief procedures makes compliance with § 409A optional.83
Likewise, the Henkel court’s reasoning that the existence of
“additional procedures” somehow makes the special timing rule
elective—even despite explicit language to the contrary84—
challenges conventional logic and a common practice in the IRC.
3. The Henkel Court’s Ruling on Special Timing Rule is
Dictum
Notwithstanding its problematic conclusion, the Henkel court’s
commentary on the special timing rule should be analyzed in its
appropriate context. Specifically, its “ruling” on the special timing
rule represents nonbinding dictum.85 Although the court “finds the
[s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule is not mandatory,” this finding had no
bearing on the final disposition of the case, which the court
ultimately decided on ERISA grounds.86
Specifically, the court ruled not that the Henkel Corporation
violated the IRC by failing to use the special timing rule;87 rather, it
ruled that the Henkel Corporation’s failure to use the special timing
rule in this case actually resulted in a higher tax liability to plan
participants, which undermined the plan’s purpose as a taxHenkel court cites as an argument against the mandatory nature of the FICA regulations. See Henkel
Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8.
83. See I.R.C. § 409A (2012). “Because of the draconian restrictions of 409A, it is very important to
determine whether a particular arrangement is covered by its provisions.” OLSHAN & SCHOHN, supra
note 82, at 12. As explained in official guidance from the IRS, “if at any time . . . a nonqualified
deferred compensation plan fails to meet the requirements of § 409A . . . all amounts deferred under the
plan . . . are includible in gross income for the taxable year . . . [and] also [are] subject to interest and an
additional income tax.” I.R.S. Notice 2005-1, 2005-1 C.B. 274 (Dec. 20, 2004).
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dictum” as “[a] statement of opinion or belief considered
authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it.” Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). Although legal dicta can often be considered “extremely useful to the profession,” “such
passages are not essential to the deciding of the very case.” Id. (citing WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF
MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 307 (Roger W. Cooley & Charles Lesley Ames eds., 3d ed.
1914)).
86. Davidson v. Henkel Corp., No. 12–cv–14103, 2015 WL 74257, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2015)
(“Considering the Parties’ context and considering all of the provisions of this Plan, the Court finds that
Defendants’ position in this case is inconsistent with the purpose and terms of the Plan.”); see discussion
and accompanying notes supra Section I.C.1.
87. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8–9.
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advantaged retirement savings plan and therefore violated the
enforcement requirements of ERISA.88 Indeed, as the court observed,
“[t]his case is not about how Defendants resolved the FICA issue
after it arose, but instead about how the FICA issue came about in the
first place. Intrinsically, this case is not about taxes, but is instead
about Defendants’ administration of the Plan.”89
Pursuant to this analysis—not its analysis of the special timing rule
itself—the court ultimately found liability against the Henkel
Corporation, denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
and granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs.90 This might
explain why the court spent only two paragraphs of its ten-page
decision analyzing the special timing rule itself.91 Ultimately, that
finding had only an indirect impact on the ruling of the case.92
Therefore, the court’s commentary on the special timing rule
should be kept in its appropriate context: nonbinding dictum that fell
outside the scope of the precise question at issue.93
B. The Special Timing Rule Almost Always Reduces Taxes
Even if the IRC does not otherwise mandate use of the special
timing rule, the Henkel court’s reasoning suggests that the special
timing rule would still be mandatory for all practical purposes to
avoid violating the enforcement provisions of ERISA, as the Henkel
Corporation did, to the extent the special timing rule results in a
lower tax liability to employees.94 In other words, the court’s
ruling—that the Henkel Corporation violated ERISA by increasing
employees’ tax liability but that federal tax law does not itself
mandate the special timing rule—is problematic because the special

88. Id.; see discussion and accompanying notes supra Section I.C.1.
89. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *3.
90. Id. at *8–10 (“Accordingly, the Court finds that the [p]laintiffs are entitled to summary judgment
with respect to Count I because [d]efendants failed to adhere to the purpose and terms of the Plan
resulting in a reduced benefit to the [p]laintiffs.”).
91. See id. at *8.
92. Id. at *3.
93. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
94. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss2/4

16

Ponce: How Special Is the Special Timing Rule? Analyzing the Timing of F

2018]

SPECIAL TIMING RULE

443

timing rule almost always results in a lower tax liability to the
employee.95
Since the fundamental purpose of a nonqualified deferred
compensation plan is to provide employees with tax-advantaged
retirement savings,96 and since ERISA’s enforcement provisions
require employers “to adhere to the purpose and terms of the Plan,”97
this suggests that ERISA—if not the IRC itself—requires employers
to apply the FICA withholding method specifically created to afford
greater tax advantages for nonqualified plans—namely, the special
timing rule.98 To do otherwise, as the Henkel Corporation did,
applies the general timing rule and causes the employees to forgo the
benefits of the special timing rule and pay “more in FICA taxes than
they would have owed had [the employer] properly and timely paid
taxes when they were due.”99
This shows exactly what makes the special timing rule so
special—namely, that by subjecting deferred compensation to FICA
taxation earlier under the special timing rule, in the vast majority of
conceivable cases, the taxpayer ultimately pays less tax.100 Therefore,
95. Perhaps the most powerful advantage of the special timing rule derives from the application of
another related provision of the regulations called the “nonduplication rule.” See Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3121(v)(2)-1(a)(2)(iii) (2003). The nonduplication rule provides that “[o]nce an amount deferred
under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan is taken into account . . . then neither the amount taken
into account nor the income attributable to [that] amount . . . is treated as wages for FICA tax purposes
at any time thereafter” Id. (emphasis added).
This represents a powerful tax advantage and can have a dramatic impact on limiting a
taxpayer’s FICA liability, especially in circumstances where the value of the nonqualified benefit grows
over time. See MCNEIL, supra note 1, at § 12:4 (“The importance of applying the special timing rule . . .
cannot be overstated. Because, once an amount deferred under such a plan is taken into account as
wages under the special timing rule, then neither the amount taken into account nor the income
attributable to the amount taken into account is treated as wages for FICA tax purposes at any time
thereafter under the ‘nonduplication rule.’”).
Also, the special timing rule benefits taxpayers by allowing the inclusion of FICA during
working years when the taxpayer has already met the SSWB. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 109.
Moreover, early inclusion under the special timing rule protects the taxpayer against future increases in
tax rate. The introduction of an additional 0.9% surtax is a recent example. Id.
96. Employers use nonqualified deferred compensation plans to “attract, retain and motivate” key
employees by “[providing] additional retirement benefits” and “[achieving] certain and desired business
objectives for which incentives may be provided” to such key employees. MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 1:2.
97. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *9.
98. See I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2) (2012).
99. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *9.
100. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Notably, some scenarios exist wherein applying the
special timing rule could result in higher taxes. As an example, this would be the case in the following
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even if federal tax law does not itself mandate use of the special
timing rule, as Henkel found, employers must nonetheless apply the
special timing rule to avoid undermining the tax planning purpose of
nonqualified deferred compensation plans or else risk violating
ERISA’s enforcement provisions.101
C. Practical Problems with an Elective Special Timing Rule
Lastly, if the special timing rule was not mandatory, an elective
special timing rule would create “many unanswered questions” and
practical problems for employers.102 Specifically, with an elective
special timing rule, a critical question arises as to who makes the
election: the employer or the employee.103 In the Henkel decision, it
was unclear to the court how far employers would “have to go to
minimize FICA taxation to avoid indemnifying participants.”104
Even if the Henkel court had applied the special timing rule
correctly, a question still would have arisen as to “whether the use of
FICA’s special timing rule [would be] sufficient” to avoid liability to
employees crying foul over the employer’s handling of tax
withholding.105 Further, a question arises as to whether employers
owe “any indemnification for taxes higher than the absolute
minimum.”106 If so, employers must also determine whether to make
such indemnification through a “simple payment of those amounts or
a full gross-up.”107 Lastly, and perhaps most interestingly, the Henkel
decision raises questions as to whether participants in nonqualified
plans “would start to insist on optimized FICA strategies as a

circumstances: (1) the benefit gets subject to early inclusion under the special timing rule; (2) the benefit
subsequently decreases (whether from poor market performance for a defined contribution plan or an
increase in the discount rate in a defined benefit plan); (3) a FICA overpayment results; and (4) the
taxpayer cannot claim a refund because the overpayment happened in a closed year. See Nunn et al.,
supra note 4, at 109.
101. See Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8–10.
102. MCNEIL, supra note 1, at § 12:5.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss2/4

18

Ponce: How Special Is the Special Timing Rule? Analyzing the Timing of F

2018]

SPECIAL TIMING RULE

445

standard clause in employment contracts” and “whether employers
would have to determine the optimal strategy for each executive.”108
In this manner, by declaring the special timing rule “not
mandatory,” the Henkel court goes outside the guidance provided in
the regulations that declares the special timing rule “not elective,”
and opens a proverbial Pandora’s box of issues not considered by the
final regulations.109
III. Proposal
Given this uncertainty and the practical issues raised by the Henkel
case, the IRS should timely respond by providing authoritative
commentary of its own, rolling back the relevant language in Henkel
and reiterating that federal tax law indeed requires employers to
apply the special timing rule when applicable.
A. The IRS Should Issue a Notice
Specifically, the IRS should issue a notice in response to the
Henkel case. A notice represents an efficient way for the IRS to
provide authoritative guidance on issues that require substantive
interpretations of the Code or governing regulations.110 In this case,
the notice should clarify that the Henkel court’s commentary on the
special timing rule is not binding and should further reiterate the
language found in the preamble to the regulations, which states that
the special timing rule is not elective and must be applied in the
context of nonqualified deferred compensation.111

108. MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:5.
109. Id.
110. Understanding IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://perma.cc/8FW5-57J6] (last
updated July 6, 2016) (“A notice is a public pronouncement that may contain guidance that involves
substantive interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code or other provisions of the law. For example,
notices can be used to relate what regulations will say in situations where the regulations may not be
published in the immediate future.”).
111. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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1. Reducing Ambiguity
Issuing a notice in this context furthers several important goals.
First, rolling back Henkel’s commentary reduces ambiguity in the tax
code—a worthwhile goal in itself.112 Before Henkel, the only
authority on the issue of whether § 3121(v)(2) required early
inclusion under the special timing rule came from the preamble to the
regulations themselves, which provides an answer in the
affirmative.113 After Henkel, however, the court’s commentary to the
contrary leaves both employers and employees without a clear,
bright-line rule in a complex area of law already ripe for confusion
and administrative error.114 The practitioner can have only limited
confidence in its administrative practices with the regulations
providing on the one hand that “the special timing rule is not
elective,”115 and the district court in Henkel, on the other hand, that
“the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule is not mandatory.”116 In this way, a
notice helps resolve the contradiction and provides practitioners with
a clear rule in an already complex area of law.
2. Limiting Further Litigation
Second, limiting Henkel’s relevant language reduces the likelihood
of further litigation between employees and employers in this area.
Although Henkel’s primary lesson for employers should rightly be to
recognize the importance of timely FICA taxation,117 the court’s
suggestion that parties can choose whether to apply the special timing
112. See Yoseph Edrey, Constitutional Review and Tax Law: An Analytical Framework, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1187, 1194, 1198–1200 (“Adam Smith taught us that taxes in a democratic-liberal society should
follow four basic attributes (‘canons or maxims of good tax’) and should be: (1) Certain and not
arbitrary; (2) Considerate of the convenience for the contributor; (3) Efficient; and (4) Fair and
Equitable.”) (citing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 777–79 (Edward Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1937) (1784)).
113. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
114. See Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 110 (citing “administrative complexity” as one of the possible
“cons of early inclusion” under the special timing rule).
115. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544.
116. Davidson v. Henkel Corp., No. 12–cv–14103, 2015 WL 74257, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2015).
117. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 126 (“Davidson v. Henkel will give some employers a new
appreciation for the importance of paying FICA taxes in a timely manner.”); MCNEIL, supra note 1,
§ 12:5.
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rule creates situations not considered by the guidance in the
regulations and thereby invites future litigation.118
For example, one need not stretch the imagination to foresee
employers responding to Henkel in the following way: First, the
employer amends its nonqualified plan documents to soften or
eliminate the “tax withholding” provisions that required the Henkel
Corporation to “properly withhold the [p]articipants’ taxes when they
were assessable or due,”119 thereby reducing exposure to the ERISA
analysis on which the court decided Henkel.120 Then, in the event of a
future “administrative error”121 similar to the Henkel Corporation’s,
the employer relies on Henkel’s language that “nothing in the [IRC]
[mandates] use of the [s]pecial [t]iming [r]ule” to skirt liability
against employees who suffered the same harm as the Henkel
employees.122 As a result, these hypothetical employees find
themselves with retirement benefits markedly reduced by application
of the general timing rule but with no recourse against the employer
that committed the exact same error as the Henkel Corporation, save
for the foresight to amend its plan document.
Thus, an IRS notice that mandates the special timing rule
eliminates this possibility by ensuring that all employers be held to
the special timing rule regardless of how they craft provisions in any
particular plan document. A notice would, in this sense, ensure
consistency across employers and eliminate the possibility that
employers pull language from Henkel to insulate themselves from
liability to their employees.

118. See supra Section II.C.
119. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *8–10.
120. See Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 126 (advising employers to “consider amending related
nonqualified plan documents to clarify that the employer has no obligation to minimize a participant’s
income or FICA tax liabilities, that determinations by the employer are not contestable, and that any suit
to recover benefits be brought within three years of the date that written ‘proof of loss’ was required to
be furnished”).
121. Henkel Corp., 2015 WL 74257, at *1 (referencing the Henkel letter that stated, “it was
determined that Social Security FICA payroll taxes associated with your nonqualified retirement
benefits have not been properly withheld . . . .”).
122. Id. at *8.

Published by Reading Room, 2018

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

448

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

3. Promoting Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
Third, by creating a bright-line rule that reduces regulatory
ambiguity123 and limits the likelihood of future litigation,124 a notice
mandating the special timing rule actually promotes the creation and
continuation of nonqualified deferred compensation plans as a
meaningful human resource tool for sponsor companies. One
possible (and hopeful) effect of Henkel on employers might be to
take better care in the administration of FICA taxes in nonqualified
plans.125
An unintended effect, however, might be to chill the use of
nonqualified plans among employers who view Henkel as a sign that
administrative error will result in class action litigation from
company employees.126 Although an IRS notice that mandates the
special timing rule would surely reinforce for employers the high
stakes of proper administration, it would, however, also ease tensions
created by ambiguity in the rules. In this way, further guidance
promotes predictability that employers need in the already complex
area of nonqualified plan administration.
For these reasons, the IRS should issue a notice rolling back
nonbinding commentary from Henkel and reiterating that the Code
mandates use of the special timing rule in nonqualified deferred
compensation.
B. No Need to Issue New Regulations
Given the specificity of the issue and the narrow focus of this
proposed response, a notice—as opposed to other forms of treasury
guidance—represents the most efficient tool for the IRS to provide
authoritative guidance on the subject.127 Such guidance need not be
in the form of a formal ruling, which the IRS drafts in response to
123. See supra Section III.A.1.
124. See supra Section III.A.2.
125. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 126; MCNEIL, supra note 1, at § 12:5.
126. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 126 (“[E]mployers may reconsider how far they are willing to go to
minimize FICA taxation on deferred compensation.”).
127. See Understanding IRS Guidance, supra note 110.
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requests for specific, private rulings or technical advice.128 Although
the IRS may receive such requests on the special timing rule,129
particularly with a renewed focus on FICA taxation post-Henkel,130
the IRS should not wait for such requests to enter the dialogue and let
ambiguity persist any longer.
Further, the IRS need not go through the lengthy process131 to
issue new regulations on the special timing rule. The existing
Treasury Regulation § 31.3121(v)(2)–1, released in 1999 after a
lengthy comment period, already provides the necessary framework
for the special timing rule and even addresses the specific question
presented.132 The purpose of a new notice, then, would be to merely
respond to relevant language in Henkel and reiterate the language
from the preamble that employers must use the special timing rule
where applicable.133
128. See id.
129. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. 4542-01, 4544 (Jan.
29, 1999) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 31 & 602).
130. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 126; MCNEIL, supra note 1, § 12:5.
131. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544. The process
for issuing new formal regulations involves several distinct steps. Published Guidance and Other
Guidance to Taxpayers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001001.html (last updated Sept. 23, 2011) [https://perma.cc/6UV3-HDA6].
First, the IRS issues an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), which represents
the initial announcement of the regulatory “problem” and indicates the anticipated regulatory approach.
Id. “When an ANPRM is issued, it is typically issued early in the rulemaking process, but can be issued
at any time in the regulatory process it becomes clear that an ANPRM would be the most appropriate
form of guidance.” Id.
Next, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) announces to the public that the IRS plans to
modify existing regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and opens a period of public
comment on the newly proposed regulations. Id. “NPRMs contain a preamble that explains the rules and
requests public comments on the suggested changes.” Id. Note that “[t]axpayers generally may not rely
on proposed regulations for planning purposes, except if there are no applicable final or temporary
regulations in force and there is an express statement in the proposed regulations that taxpayers may rely
on them currently.” Id.
Then, the IRS issues temporary regulations for publication in the Office of the Federal Register
to provide formal guidance. Published Guidance and Other Guidance to Taxpayers, supra. “Temporary
regulations are effective when published by the Office of the Federal Register.” Id. Note further that
“IRC § 7805(e) requires the IRS to publish a cross-referencing NPRM when it publishes a temporary
regulation.” Id.
Lastly, after the public comment period closes, the IRS publishes its final regulations, which cite
the underlying NPRM and address and analyze any public comments received. Id. “The preamble of a
final rule also cites to the underlying NPRM and other rulemaking history.” Id.
132. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544.
133. Id.
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C. No Need to Impose New Penalties
Lastly, if the IRS clarifies that treasury regulations mandate use of
the special timing rule as proposed, a question naturally arises as to
what penalties, if any, the IRS must impose for failure to do so.134
However, the IRS need not introduce new penalties for employers
that fail to apply the special timing rule as required. Although the
preamble to the final regulations references “interest and penalties”
that “may be imposed,”135 at least two reasons explain why a notice
from the IRS need not entail new or additional penalties.
First, by issuing a notice that clarifies that existing regulations
mandate the special timing rule notwithstanding language from
Henkel, the IRS does not change the current requirements, but merely
clarifies an existing one.136 As such, no need for additional penalties
exists. Instead, a new notice, as proposed, would merely clarify that
“[t]he special timing rule is not elective and, if an employer does not
take an amount deferred into account . . . when required by
§ 3121(v)(2), interest and penalties may be imposed.”137 Although
the existing regulations do not elsewhere describe further “interest
and penalties,” a notice clarifying existing requirements need go no
further than the requirements already in place.
Second, because § 3121(v)(2) requires taxpayers who fail to apply
the special timing rule to use general timing,138 and because the
general timing rule generally results in higher FICA taxes,139
applying the general timing rule could reasonably be interpreted as
itself representing the “penalty” for failure to apply the special timing
rule under § 3121(v)(2).140 Of course, some scenarios exist wherein
134. Id. (stating that “interest and penalties may be imposed”).
135. Id.
136. See supra Section III.A.1.
137. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544.
138. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(d)(ii)(A) (2003) (stating that “[f]ailure to take an amount deferred
into account under the special timing rule” results in the “benefit payments attributable to that amount
deferred [being] included as wages in accordance with the general timing rule of paragraph (a)(1) of this
section”).
139. See supra Section II.B.
140. Nunn et al., supra note 4, at 106 (“The penalty for failing to follow FICA’s special timing rule
for deferred compensation is the generally increased FICA tax under the general timing rule.”);
MCNEIL, supra note 1, at § 12:5.
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early inclusion under the special timing rule actually increases
taxes.141 However, the IRS’s underlying purpose in mandating the
special timing rule need not seek to categorically minimize taxes, but
instead to provide a clear, bright-line rule for employers to follow
and thereby avoid the inherent complications that arise from an
elective special timing rule.142 For these reasons, then, a notice from
the IRS that mandates the special timing rule need not introduce
additional penalties, recognizing that failure to apply the special
timing rule in itself generally penalizes the taxpayer.
CONCLUSION
Despite language to the contrary in the recent Henkel case, “[t]he
special timing rule is not elective.”143 Although Henkel did not create
the ambiguity surrounding the special timing rule, it has exacerbated
it.144 As the first case to provide commentary on the special timing
rule, by declaring that it “finds nothing in the IRC mandating [its]
use,”145 the case contradicts express direction in the treasury
regulations that requires employers who offer nonqualified deferred
compensation plans to apply the special timing rule for FICA
taxation or else face “interest and penalties.”146 In Henkel, the court’s
dicta147 indicate otherwise, creating new and problematic uncertainty
for employers where it need not exist.148 Although the court properly
found Henkel liable for damages, its comments on the special timing
rule open the door to contingencies not considered by the
regulations.149

141. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
142. See supra Sections III.A.1–3.
143. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. 4542-01, 4544 (Jan.
29, 1999) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 31 & 602); see supra Part II.
144. See supra Part II.
145. Davidson v. Henkel Corp., No. 12–cv–14103, 2015 WL 74257, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2015).
146. FICA Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4544; see supra
Section II.A.1.
147. See supra Section II.A.3.
148. See supra Sections III.A.1–3.
149. See supra Section II.C.
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Therefore, the IRS should timely respond with its own
authoritative commentary to limit the potential confusion created by
Henkel. Specifically, the IRS should issue a notice that explains
Henkel is nonbinding and that reinforces the special timing rule is not
elective.150 Doing so benefits both employees and employers by
reducing uncertainty in an already complex regulatory
environment,151 limiting the likelihood of future litigation between
employees and employers,152 and promoting the use of nonqualified
deferred compensation as a human resource tool by providing a clear,
bright-line rule.153 For these reasons, the IRS should take the simple
steps of issuing a notice to resolve such ambiguity where it need not
exist.

150.
151.
152.
153.

See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.A.1.
See supra Section III.A.2.
See supra Section III.A.3.
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